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Insular Decision-making in the Board Room : Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/33408
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/3340834a4180e-9f98-4e95-a071-412f0bc762f6
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Insular Decision-making in the Board Room : Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | CEO Succession Policy | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Board's Monitoring | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Board Composition | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | CEO's Firm Specific Knowledge | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL Codes: D79, G30, K22, L29, L22. | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Sato, Meg
× Sato, Meg |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 値 | The Australian National University | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | It is widely believed that corporate boards are overly reluctant to .re their CEOs. The conventional explanation for retaining a CEO regardless of his/her talent is that a CEO chooses the board members and has the power to .re them. However, very few studies have investigated how a new CEO is chosen. This paper explores an unexamined cause of board reluctance in removing a CEO: the incentive to minimize the leakage from the decision-makers. future surplus. I argue that this same logic provides the theoretical explanation for how a new CEO is chosen for both voluntary and forced CEO replacements. I show that this incentive of the incumbent board and CEO often departs from the shareholders.interest. In short, if the net surplus of the incumbent board and CEO is expected to be larger under an incumbent sub-standard CEO, or under an internal candidate rather than an external candidate, then they retain the incumbent sub-standard CEO or promote an internal CEO candidate, even though the expected corporate pro.t generated by appointing an external candidate is likely to have been greater. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-710, 発行日 2010-01 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 335 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| 値 | Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | |||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf710ab.html | |||||
