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Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/51835
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/518358a00db8a-b936-4a00-b952-ec0bdeed77b4
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Revenue-Maximization | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Multiunit Exchanges | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Outside Options | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Modified Virtual Valuation | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Single-Unit Demands | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Position Exchanges | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: D44, D61, D82 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We investigate multiunit exchange where a central planner and participants both bring commodities to sell and the central planner plays the role of platform provider. The central planner has restrictions on allocations. We characterize the optimal mechanism concerning his (her) revenue under incentive compatibility and individual rationality in the ex-post term. We introduce modified virtual valuation and show that the optimization problem can be replaced with the maximization of modified virtual valuations. We apply our results to important problems of single-unit demands and position exchanges. We demonstrate a clock auction design that implements the optimal position allocation through dominant strategies. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-853, 発行日 2012-05 |
|||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2012/2012cf853ab.html |