{"_buckets": {"deposit": "3037155d-be13-4f68-afb2-91b4bf26e19e"}, "_deposit": {"id": "42389", "owners": [], "pid": {"revision_id": 0, "type": "depid", "value": "42389"}, "status": "published"}, "_oai": {"id": "oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042389"}, "item_8_biblio_info_7": {"attribute_name": "\u66f8\u8a8c\u60c5\u5831", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"bibliographicIssueDates": {"bibliographicIssueDate": "2002-06", "bibliographicIssueDateType": "Issued"}, "bibliographicVolumeNumber": "2002-CF-154", "bibliographic_titles": [{"bibliographic_title": "Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]}, "item_8_description_13": {"attribute_name": "\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30de\u30c3\u30c8", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "application/pdf", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_8_description_5": {"attribute_name": "\u6284\u9332", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "This paper investigates general two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity. We assume that monitoring is imperfect and private, and players\u0027private signals are correlated through the unobservable macro shock. We show that a sequential equilibrium payoff vector approximates efficiency in a wide class of environments when the size of the set of private signals for each player is sufficiently large in comparison with the size of the set of possible macro shocks as well as the size of the set of actions for the opponent. We require almost no condition on the accuracy of players\u0027monitoring technology. We argue that the use of review strategy works very well in the private monitoring case, although it does not work well in the public monitoring case. We apply our efficiency result to a model of price-setting duopoly a la Stigler (1964), where each firm\u0027s price choice is unobservable to its rival firm and the sales level for each firm is regarded as its private signal. Contrarily to Stigler\u0027s conjecture, the full cartel collusion can be self-enforcing even if firms cannot communicate and have the option of making secret price cuts.", "subitem_description_type": "Abstract"}]}, "item_8_description_6": {"attribute_name": "\u5185\u5bb9\u8a18\u8ff0", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "This paper was combined with Discussion Paper 2001-CF-123 and revised as Discussion Paper 2003-Cf-242.", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}, {"subitem_description": "\u672c\u6587\u30d5\u30a3\u30eb\u306f\u30ea\u30f3\u30af\u5148\u3092\u53c2\u7167\u306e\u3053\u3068", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_8_publisher_20": {"attribute_name": "\u51fa\u7248\u8005", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_publisher": "\u65e5\u672c\u7d4c\u6e08\u56fd\u969b\u5171\u540c\u30bb\u30f3\u30bf\u30fc"}]}, "item_8_relation_25": {"attribute_name": "\u95a2\u4fc2URI", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_relation_type_id": {"subitem_relation_type_id_text": "http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2002/2002cf154ab.html", "subitem_relation_type_select": "URI"}}]}, "item_8_source_id_10": {"attribute_name": "\u66f8\u8a8c\u30ec\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9ID", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_source_identifier": "AA11450569", "subitem_source_identifier_type": "NCID"}]}, "item_8_subject_15": {"attribute_name": "\u65e5\u672c\u5341\u9032\u5206\u985e\u6cd5", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "330", "subitem_subject_scheme": "NDC"}]}, "item_8_text_21": {"attribute_name": "\u51fa\u7248\u8005\u5225\u540d", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]}, "item_8_text_34": {"attribute_name": "\u8cc7\u6e90\u30bf\u30a4\u30d7", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "Discussion Paper"}]}, "item_8_text_4": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005\u6240\u5c5e", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "University of Tokyo"}]}, "item_access_right": {"attribute_name": "\u30a2\u30af\u30bb\u30b9\u6a29", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_access_right": "metadata only access", "subitem_access_right_uri": "http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Matsushima, Hitoshi"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "97591", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_keyword": {"attribute_name": "\u30ad\u30fc\u30ef\u30fc\u30c9", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "Discounted Repeated Games", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Imperfect Private Monitoring", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Review Strategies", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Correlated Signals", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Random Macro Shocks", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Efficiency", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Secret Price Cut", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "\u8a00\u8a9e", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "\u8cc7\u6e90\u30bf\u30a4\u30d7", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "technical report", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]}, "item_title": "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts"}]}, "item_type_id": "8", "owner": "1", "path": ["9/7435/7436", "62/7433/7434"], "permalink_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2430", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "\u516c\u958b\u65e5", "attribute_value": "2013-06-03"}, "publish_date": "2013-06-03", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "42389", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts"], "weko_shared_id": null}