WEKO3
アイテム
Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2430
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/24308db373f6-bee2-4eae-b0b7-f6474ab7728d
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-06-03 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Discounted Repeated Games | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Imperfect Private Monitoring | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Review Strategies | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Correlated Signals | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Random Macro Shocks | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Efficiency | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Secret Price Cut | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
|||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper investigates general two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity. We assume that monitoring is imperfect and private, and players'private signals are correlated through the unobservable macro shock. We show that a sequential equilibrium payoff vector approximates efficiency in a wide class of environments when the size of the set of private signals for each player is sufficiently large in comparison with the size of the set of possible macro shocks as well as the size of the set of actions for the opponent. We require almost no condition on the accuracy of players'monitoring technology. We argue that the use of review strategy works very well in the private monitoring case, although it does not work well in the public monitoring case. We apply our efficiency result to a model of price-setting duopoly a la Stigler (1964), where each firm's price choice is unobservable to its rival firm and the sales level for each firm is regarded as its private signal. Contrarily to Stigler's conjecture, the full cartel collusion can be self-enforcing even if firms cannot communicate and have the option of making secret price cuts. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper was combined with Discussion Paper 2001-CF-123 and revised as Discussion Paper 2003-Cf-242. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 2002-CF-154, 発行日 2002-06 |
|||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 330 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2002/2002cf154ab.html | |||||
