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Decentralized leadership meets soft budget
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2666
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2666764d5d8d-405f-49bb-842a-afd9f9ebff59
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-06-03 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Decentralized leadership meets soft budget | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | decentralized leadership | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | soft budget | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: H71, H72, H73, H77 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Akai, Nobuo
× Akai, Nobuo× Sato, Motohiro |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Hyogo | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Hitotubashi University | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | The objectives of the present paper are twofold. First, we aim to synthesize the two strands of the literature on the incentive effect of intergovernmental transfers, the decentralized leadership and the soft budget problem both of which address the discretionary nature of the central transfer policy. We develop a simple decentralized leadership model in which the local governments move first and the central government transfer scheme is decided ex post. The ex post discretion of transfer by the central government pursuing social welfare distorts the ex ante incentive of the local governments, inducing the strategic action of the latter government. This paper also shows that the direction of the ex ante distortion moral hazard problem relies on what decision is made ex ante by type of authority is given to the local government, namely public expenditure or tax collection ex ante. Second we examine the robustness of the incentive problem. The benchmark model incorporates spillovers and is extended in several directions, including tax competition and distortionary taxes, and two period setting. The essence of the incentive problem remains the same. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-391, 発行日 2005-12 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 330 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2005/2005cf391ab.html | |||||
