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Role of Honesty in Full Implementation
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2680
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/26805773afe2-2f0a-4464-8071-b8ef2312a2c3
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2013-06-03 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Role of Honesty in Full Implementation | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Preferences for Honesty | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Detail-free | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Full Implementation | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Small Fines | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Permissive Results | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D71, D78, H41 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper introduces a new concept for full implementation that takes into account agents'preferences for understanding how the "process" works. We assume that the agents have an intrinsic preference for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it does not influence their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the principal. We show that the presence of such preferences functions very effectively in eliminating unwanted equilibria from the practical perspectives, even if the degree of preference for honesty is small. The mechanisms designed are detail-free and involve only small fines. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | Revised version of CIRJE-F-304 (2004). | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-405, 発行日 2006-03 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 330 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2006/2006cf405ab.html |