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Strategic Central Bank Communication : Discourse and Game-Theoretic Analyses of the Bank of Japan’s Monthly Report
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/59278
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/59278bd2d1597-8f76-4b83-bbac-b8d5e0428954
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
wp080.pdf (739.8 kB)
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| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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| 公開日 | 2016-03-07 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Strategic Central Bank Communication : Discourse and Game-Theoretic Analyses of the Bank of Japan’s Monthly Report | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | monetary policy | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | transparency | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | natural language processing | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | modality | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | verifiable disclosure model | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| 著者 |
Kawamura, Kohei
× Kawamura, Kohei× Kobashi, Yohei× Shizume, Masato× Ueda, Kozo |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Edinburgh | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Waseda University | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA) | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | We conduct a discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan's Monthly Report and examine its characteristics in relation to business cycles. We find that the difference between the number of positive and negative expressions in the reports leads the leading index of the economy by approximately three months, which suggests that the central bank's reports have some superior information about the state of the economy. Moreover, ambiguous expressions tend to appear more frequently with negative expressions. Using a simple persuasion game, we argue that the use of ambiguity in communication by the central bank can be seen as strategic information revelation when the central bank has an incentive to bias the reports (and hence beliefs in the market) upwards. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 2012～2016年度科学研究費補助金[基盤研究(S)]「長期デフレの解明」(研究代表者 東京大学経済学研究科・渡辺努, 課題番号：24223003) | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) Understanding Persistent Deflation in Japan Working Paper Series 巻 080, 発行日 2016-03 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | UTokyo Price Project | |||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.price.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/researchdata/ | |||||
