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Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2670
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2670142997a0-a0ba-4a85-90b4-c9c8bc410dad
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2017-01-17 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, L13 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Kandori, Michihiro
× Kandori, Michihiro |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When agents interact only once, they often have an incentive to deviate from cooperation. In a repeated interaction, however, any mutually beneficial outcome can be sustained in an equilibrium. This fact, known as the folk theorem, is explained under various information structures. This entry also compares repeated games with other means to achieve efficiency and briefly discuss the scope for potential applications. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-395, 発行日 2006-01 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 330 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2006/2006cf395ab.html | |||||
| 異版あり | ||||||
| 関連タイプ | hasVersion | |||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00669.x | |||||
