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  1. 117 経済学研究科・経済学部
  2. 70 日本経済国際共同センター
  3. Discussion Paper F series (in English)
  1. 0 資料タイプ別
  2. 60 レポート類
  3. 061 ディスカッションペーパー

Capitalist Politicians, Socialist Bureaucrats? Legends of Government Planning from Japan

http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2453
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2453
0f5ddfaa-50df-4c1c-8b4f-e4f9ab2497ff
Item type テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1)
公開日 2017-01-17
タイトル
タイトル Capitalist Politicians, Socialist Bureaucrats? Legends of Government Planning from Japan
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh
タイプ technical report
アクセス権
アクセス権 metadata only access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb
著者 Miwa, Yoshiro

× Miwa, Yoshiro

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Miwa, Yoshiro

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J., Mark Ramseyer

× J., Mark Ramseyer

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J., Mark Ramseyer

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著者所属
著者所属 University of Tokyo
著者所属
著者所属 Harvard Law School
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 The debate over the role bureaucrats played in the postwar Japanese economy has been the wrong debate. To date, it has been a debate about effectiveness: the government tried to promote growth through interventionist policies, but did it succeed? In fact, the government never tried. Majority voters did not want interventionist bureaucrats, and consistently rejected communist and socialist candidates offering interventionist approaches. Instead, they chose candidates from the centrist, decidedly non-interventionist party. Reflecting those electoral market exigencies, politicians in power seldom gave their bureaucrats the authority to alter market investment and production decisions. To explore these issues, we first investigate the tools Japanese politicians gave their bureaucrats. We find that bureaucrats lacked the mechanisms they would have needed to shape significantly production or investment. Second, we reexamine the central anecdote behind the legend of Japanese bureaucratic power: the 1965 showdown between Sumitomo Metals and MITI. We find that Sumitomo rather than MITI won the battle. Last, we survey the case law on bureaucratic power, and find that Japanese courts strictly restricted bureaucratic discretion. There is a broader moral here, and it goes to the perils of relying on secondary research. For obvious reasons, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats encouraged stories that disguised ordinary pork-barrel policies as growth-enhancing intervention. Although the tales they told differed little from the self-serving accounts politicians tell everywhere, in the 1960s most Japanese social scientists were Marxists. Understandably, they had little sense of how markets worked, and no skepticism at all about the powers of governments to plan. Yet it is their accounts on which modern observers rely for their picture of the postwar Japanese political economy. Had modern scholars done more than recount the conclusions in the secondary literature, they would have noticed that they were merely adding academic gloss to political sloganeering. Unfortunately, they never tried.
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 Antitrust Bulletin, 2003, p. 595-627. 掲載予定.
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
書誌情報 Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F

巻 2002-CF-177, 発行日 2002-10
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AA11450569
フォーマット
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 application/pdf
日本十進分類法
主題Scheme NDC
主題 330
出版者
出版者 日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
関係URI
識別子タイプ URI
関連識別子 http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2002/2002cf177ab.html
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