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Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2651
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/26512a22b014-2ad8-4e44-81c2-0bb3c3526a48
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2017-01-17 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Incentive Compatibility | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Budget Balancing | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Interim Individual Rationality | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Interative Dominance | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Full Surplus Extraction | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D44, D60, D71, D78, D82 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | In this paper, we investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We show that a direct mechanism associated with the social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality exists for generic prior distributions. We consider the possibility that a risk-averse principal extracts full surplus in agency problems with adverse selection. Additionally, with regard to generic prior distributions, we show that there exists a modified direct mechanism associated with the virtual social choice function, which satisfies budget balancing and interim individual rationality, such that truth telling is the unique three times iteratively undominated message rule profile. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | Journal of Economic Theory (regular article). 掲載予定. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-376, 発行日 2005-09 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 330 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2005/2005cf376ab.html |