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Overlapping Tax Revenue, Soft Budget, and Rent Seeking
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/37287
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/3728712b55f18-6716-437d-9ebf-b188399c6556
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2017-01-17 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Overlapping Tax Revenue, Soft Budget, and Rent Seeking | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL classification: E6, H5, H6 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Soft-budget constraint | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | local investment | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | rent seeking | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Ihori, Toshihiro
× Ihori, Toshihiro |
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著者別名 | ||||||
識別子 | 98608 | |||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
姓名 | 井堀, 利宏 | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical externality of local public investment by stimulating local expenditure when both the central and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities financed by public investment. The model incorporates the local governments'rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities, although a soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-750, 発行日 2010-07 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf750ab.html | |||||
異版あり | ||||||
関連タイプ | hasVersion | |||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-010-9146-8 |