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建国期のイスラエル内閣閣議議事録史料紹介と予備的考察（五）＜前篇＞ : 『暫定政府会合議事録』第3 巻後半～第4 巻初（1948 年6 月20 日～6 月27 日）に見るベルナドット和平提案前夜の内政・外交とアルタレナ号事件をめぐる論議
https://doi.org/10.15083/00077042
https://doi.org/10.15083/000770428a41ee5a-785a-4fd2-abd0-a52a1a577ac7
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
ioc174002.pdf (1.0 MB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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| 公開日 | 2019-05-15 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | 建国期のイスラエル内閣閣議議事録史料紹介と予備的考察（五）＜前篇＞ : 『暫定政府会合議事録』第3 巻後半～第4 巻初（1948 年6 月20 日～6 月27 日）に見るベルナドット和平提案前夜の内政・外交とアルタレナ号事件をめぐる論議 | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | jpn | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
| タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
| ID登録 | ||||||
| ID登録 | 10.15083/00077042 | |||||
| ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||
| その他のタイトル | ||||||
| その他のタイトル | An Introduction to and a Preliminary Review of the Proceedings of the Israeli Cabinet Meetings at the Time of the Establishment of the State of Israel（ 5）, Part I : Domestic Politics and Diplomacy on the Eve of Bernadotte’s Peace Suggestions and the Debates over the Altalena Affair in The Proceedings of the Provisional Government Meetings Vols.3-4（20 June to 27 June 1948） | |||||
| 著者 |
森, まり子
× 森, まり子 |
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| 著者別名 | ||||||
| 識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
| 識別子 | 155294 | |||||
| 姓名 | MORI, Mariko | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | 跡見学園女子大学文学部 | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | Due to limited space, this study, An Introduction to and a Preliminary Review of the Proceedings of the Israeli Cabinet Meetings at the Time of the Establishment of the State of Israel（ 5）, will be divided into two parts, Part I and Part II. This paper will be Part I（ including Introduction, Section 1, and part of Section 2） followed by Part II（ including the rest of Section 2, Section 3, and Conclusion）, which will appear in the next journal. This study as a whole gives an introduction to the latter half of Vol. 3 and the first part of Vol .4 of The Proceedings of the Provisional Government Meetings, which cover from 20 June to 27 June 1948, and gives a review of its main contents, the Arab question. As a follow-up to my previous papers published in this journal in March 2014, March 2015, March 2016, March 2017, and March 2018, it is also intended to be a preliminary step toward revisiting the formative years of Israel, this time focusing on the turbulent one week prior to the presentation of Bernadotte’s Peace Suggestions to the Arab and Jewish sides. During that week, which immediately followed the controversial cabinet meeting on 16 June 1948 when the Israeli Provisional Government seemed to incline toward a negative direction concerning the repatriation of Arab refugees, Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN Mediator, with his staffs at their headquarters at Rhodes, was intensively drafting the Peace Suggestions based on his negotiations during the preceding one month with both sides. In the same week there also occurred the Altalena affair, an incident in which an immigrant ship called Altalena, organized by Irgun（ a rightist military organization led by Menachem Begin） and bearing 900 Jewish immigrants and large quantities of weapons, arrived near Tel Aviv, despite the fact that the Truce Agreement strictly limited immigration and forbade the import of weapons during the truce. The Israeli government decided to take strong measures against this sectarian action by Irgun, which apparently ignored the authority of the newly born government as well as defied the United Nations by deliberately violating the Truce Agreement, which the Israeli government had accepted and promised to observe. During the stormy debates over the Altalena affair, which appear in the three cabinet meetings covered by this study, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Rabbi Fishman, resigned as a sign of protest against the government’s policy of using force, if necessary, against “fellow” Jews. On the domestic front, the already strained relationship between Ben-Gurion and the IDF generals was seriously exacerbated over the army reorganization, and this tension was to develop into a cabinet crisis in early July（ “Generals’ Revolt”）. Against this backdrop, and with some other factors described in the Section 1 in mind, this paper presents, among others, the following three assumptions to be analyzed in Part II. First, referring to Bernadotte’s memoirs, one finds his explanation of some of his meetings with the Jewish side somewhat different from what Shertok reported to the cabinet, especially in his interpretation and emphasis. Here one could face the old and new question of what a “fact” is in history and politics, and the question of multiple possibilities of interpretation by both sides about the same political negotiation. Secondly, the present proceedings bring into sharp relief the underlying factors of the Israeli government’s rejection of Bernadotte’s Suggestions: its strong distrust against Transjordan and its military supporter, Britain（ whose officers had continued to shell Jews in Jerusalem until the beginning of the truce） and its fresh memories of heavy Jewish bloodshed and numerous victims in the battles around Jerusalem. Thirdly, the Altalena affair seemed to have more profound political and military repercussions than usually has been imagined, affecting the ideological position of rightist military organizations in the entire Yishuv（ the Jewish community in Palestine）. In the cabinet’s debates over the affair what was condemned was not the Irgun’s fundamental “ideals” or “philosophy” but their dissident “way of doing things.” In other words, rightist militant philosophy itself was in a sense justified, and this tacit justification or the lack of condemnation seemed to pave the way for the assassination of Bernadotte by another Jewish rightist organization on 17 September 1948, less than three months after the Altalena affair. This same tendency of tacit tolerance and acquiescence within Zionist political circles toward rightist militant “philosophy” is still seen in contemporary Israel and it might, at least partly, explain the fact that the rightist governments in Israel have been legally able to hold power for so many years without seriously being challenged. These assumptions, together with other points, will be given an in-depth analysis in Part II. |
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| 書誌情報 |
東洋文化研究所紀要 = The memoirs of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia 巻 174, p. 33-124, 発行日 2019-02-28 |
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| ISSN | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | 05638089 | |||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AN00170926 | |||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||
| 値 | publisher | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 東京大学東洋文化研究所 | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The University of Tokyo | ||||||
