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Incomplete Information Robustness
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/00079227
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/00079227acc57609-0c14-44d3-8b98-7faeb8cb5c64
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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cb-wp019.pdf (323.1 kB)
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Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2020-05-13 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Incomplete Information Robustness | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Bayes correlated equilibria | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | belief hierarchies | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | belief invariance | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | generalized potentials | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | incomplete information games | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | potential games | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
著者 |
Morris, Stephen
× Morris, Stephen× Ui, Takashi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Department of Economics, Hitotsubashi University | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation in terms of an incomplete information game and makes a prediction about players’ behavior. The analyst’s model approximately describes each player’s hierarchies of beliefs over payoff-relevant states, but the true incomplete information game may have correlated duplicated belief hierarchies, and the analyst has no information about the correlation. Under these circumstances, a natural candidate for the analyst’s prediction is the set of belief-invariant Bayes correlated equilibria (BIBCE) of the analyst’s incomplete information game. We introduce the concept of robustness for BIBCE: a subset of BIBCE is robust if every nearby incomplete information game has a BIBCE that is close to some BIBCE in this set. Our main result provides a sufficient condition for robustness by introducing a generalized potential function of an incomplete information game. A generalized potential function is a function on the Cartesian product of the set of states and a covering of the action space which incorporates some information about players’ preferences. It is associated with a belief-invariant correlating device such that a signal sent to a player is a subset of the player’s actions, which can be interpreted as a vague prescription to choose some action from this subset. We show that, for every belief-invariant correlating device that maximizes the expected value of a generalized potential function, there exists a BIBCE in which every player chooses an action from a subset of actions prescribed by the device, and that the set of such BIBCE is robust, which can differ from the set of potential maximizing BNE. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | Publisher's another name: JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) Central Bank Communication Design | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | JEL classification: C72, D82 | |||||
書誌情報 |
Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 巻 019, 発行日 2020-03-30 |
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著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | publisher | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Research Project on Central Bank Communication | |||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | https://www.centralbank.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/cb-wp019.pdf | |||||
関連名称 | https://www.centralbank.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/cb-wp019.pdf | |||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.centralbank.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/category/research-data/ | |||||
関連名称 | http://www.centralbank.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/category/research-data/ |