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建国期のイスラエル内閣閣議議事録史料紹介と予備的考察(四)<前篇> : 『暫定政府会合議事録』第4巻前半(1948年6月30日~7月4日)に見るベルナドット和平提案とイスラエル国家の「主権」をめぐる論議
https://doi.org/10.15083/00026790
https://doi.org/10.15083/00026790e4b2852d-266c-45ad-9dad-20f99133faf7
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2017-04-14 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | 建国期のイスラエル内閣閣議議事録史料紹介と予備的考察(四)<前篇> : 『暫定政府会合議事録』第4巻前半(1948年6月30日~7月4日)に見るベルナドット和平提案とイスラエル国家の「主権」をめぐる論議 | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | jpn | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
ID登録 | ||||||
ID登録 | 10.15083/00026790 | |||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||
その他のタイトル | ||||||
その他のタイトル | An Introduction to and a Preliminary Review of the Proceedings of the Israeli Cabinet Meetings at the Time of the Establishment of the State of Israel (4), Part I : The Debates over Bernadotte’s Peace Suggestions and over the “Sovereignty” of the State of Israel in The Proceedings of the Provisional Government Meetings Vol.4 (30 June to 4 July 1948) | |||||
著者 |
森, まり子
× 森, まり子 |
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著者別名 | ||||||
識別子 | 59042 | |||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
姓名 | Mori, Mariko | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Due to limited space, this study, An Introduction to and a Preliminary Review of the Proceedings of the Israeli Cabinet Meetings at the Time of the Establishment of the State of Israel (4), will be divided into two parts, Par t I and Par t II. This paper will be Par t I (including Introduction, Section 1, and par t of Section 2) followed by Part II (including the rest of Section 2, Section 3, and Conclusion), which will appear in this journal in the following year. This study as a whole gives an introduction to the first half of The Proceedings of the Provisional Government Meetings, Vol.4 (30 June to 4 July 1948) and gives a review of its main contents, the Arab question. As a follow-up to my previous papers published in this journal in March 2014, March 2015, and March 2016, it is also intended to be a preliminary step toward revisiting the formative years of Israel, this time focusing on the short but critical period from late June to early July 1948. It was during this period, with the First Truce nearing its end, that Count Bernadotte’s peace suggestions were presented to Shertok, the Foreign Minister of the Israeli Provisional Government, and to Nuqrashi, the Egyptian Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Arab League Committee on the Palestine question, and were seriously debated within the Israeli government. Bernadotte emphasized that these suggestions were put forth "as a basis for discussion," and suggested that Palestine, including Transjordan, "might form a Union comprising two Members, one Arab and Jewish"; that Jewish immigration should be subject to Arab consent in the near future; that the right of Arab refugees to return to their homes without restriction and regain their property should be recognized; that the City of Jerusalem should be in Arab territory with municipal autonomy for the Jews; and that some other significant modifications should be made to the territorial arrangements of the UN Partition Resolution on 29 November 1947. The Israeli government rejected these suggestions mainly because it thought that "sovereignty" of the State of Israel was not explicitly recognized in these suggestions. This study analyzes the process of this decision-making by focusing on the cabinet proceedings during this period. This paper, Par t I, presents in the "Introduction" the following four assumptions to be analyzed in Part II: First, the meaning of "sovereignty," which the Israeli government bore in mind, may not have been identical with that borne in mind by Bernadotte and the American or European of ficials. It might also be said that the meaning of "sovereignty" was changing in Israeli politics during this period. And this change is clearly seen throughout the cabinet debates over Bernadotte’s suggestions. One conclusion that could be drawn from the debates is that, in the latter half of June 1948, the positive, bright side of "sovereignty" as synonymous with "independence" and "liberation" was obviously receding, whereas the negative, dark side of "sovereignty" as synonymous with the absolute dominance of a state over the people under its jurisdiction was coming to the fore. Such transformation in the Israelis’ notion of "sovereignty," or the shift of its center of gravity, may partly explain the Israeli government’s rejection of Bernadotte’s suggestions, its continued friction with the United Nations over the Palestine questions, and its harsh and unrestrained policy toward the Palestinians for over half a century since then. These will be analyzed in Par t II in the broader, contemporar y context of the maltreatment of domestic minorities by various state powers in the name of "sovereignty." Second, the Israeli leaders at that time clearly understood that joining the United Nations, which became an agenda during the debates over Bernadotte’s suggestions, was likely to have the following two politically grave implications: the "freezing" of the Jewish state as it was, with Arab inhabitants whose number had dramatically dropped because of their evacuation from their places of abode, and the acquiescence of such a situation by the international community. Third, while there was a consensus within the Israeli cabinet that it should definitely reject Bernadotte’s ideas of the limitation of "sovereignty", the limitation of the number of Jewish immigrants entering Israel and Arab rule over the City of Jerusalem, a consensus was never reached about other details, such as the extent of the effectiveness of the UN Partition Resolution, especially the extent of the effectiveness of its part mentioning borders (Bernadotte suggested that the Negev, which the UN Par tition Resolution designated to be a Jewish area, should be an Arab area and the Western Galilee, which the UN Partition Re solut ion de s igna t ed to be an Ar ab a r e a , should be a J ewi sh a r e a ) , internationalization of Jerusalem, relations with Transjordan, the Arab refugees’ return and the issue of their property. In the process of discussing these crucial elements included in Bernadotte’s suggestions, the latent schism within the cabinet between the moderates who had advocated political and diplomatic approach and the activists who had advocated military solutions became more visible than ever. Fourth, it seems that the Israeli government’s decision to reject Bernadotte’s suggestions stemmed from not only the international conditions and political events of the moment but of the preceding 30 years as well. If one of the main frames of reference in the Israeli government’s decision-making was the international conditions and political events in the inter-war period and the Second World War years ("obsolete" or meaningless from our present point of view), it might logically explain the "unreasonableness" (from our present point of view) of its rejection of Bernadotte’s suggestions, which, retrospectively, were the first comprehensive, internationally supported solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the acceptance of which seemed to us a "reasonable" decision in that it might have changed the tragic course of history in the region. This implies the general importance of specifying frames of reference when one tries to know the background of how an "unreasonable" political decision was made. An in-depth analysis will be given in Part II. | |||||
書誌情報 |
東洋文化研究所紀要 = The memoirs of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia 巻 171, p. 190-276, 発行日 2017-03 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 05638089 | |||||
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収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AN00170926 | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 東京大学東洋文化研究所 | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The University of Tokyo |