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Finitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma with Small Fines : Penance Contract
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/33398
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/3339849b3468b-9518-454c-91f0-717f5765c3f1
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Finitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma with Small Fines : Penance Contract | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Finitely Repeated Prisoners’Dilemma | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Small Fines | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Penance Contracts | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Full Collusion | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Uniqueness | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Renegotiation-Proofness | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D74, L14. | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We investigate the finitely repeated prisoners'dilemma with explicit contractual devices. We show that full collusion can be achieved by incentivizing the players'final period of play with small fines. Our incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if (and only if) he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. We show that using this contractual agreement brings the penance strategy profile into unique subgame perfect equilibrium and achieves full collusion without being overturned by renegotiation. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-720, 発行日 2010-03 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf726ab.html |