{"_buckets": {"deposit": "284e9a06-7c76-4360-a4fb-ad3737d623d1"}, "_deposit": {"id": "42147", "owners": [], "pid": {"revision_id": 0, "type": "depid", "value": "42147"}, "status": "published"}, "_oai": {"id": "oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042147"}, "item_8_biblio_info_7": {"attribute_name": "\u66f8\u8a8c\u60c5\u5831", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"bibliographicIssueDates": {"bibliographicIssueDate": "2010-03", "bibliographicIssueDateType": "Issued"}, "bibliographicVolumeNumber": "CIRJE-F-720", "bibliographic_titles": [{"bibliographic_title": "Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]}, "item_8_description_13": {"attribute_name": "\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30de\u30c3\u30c8", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "application/pdf", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_8_description_5": {"attribute_name": "\u6284\u9332", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "We investigate the finitely repeated prisoners\u0027dilemma with explicit contractual devices. We show that full collusion can be achieved by incentivizing the players\u0027final period of play with small fines. Our incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if (and only if) he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. We show that using this contractual agreement brings the penance strategy profile into unique subgame perfect equilibrium and achieves full collusion without being overturned by renegotiation.", "subitem_description_type": "Abstract"}]}, "item_8_description_6": {"attribute_name": "\u5185\u5bb9\u8a18\u8ff0", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "\u672c\u6587\u30d5\u30a3\u30eb\u306f\u30ea\u30f3\u30af\u5148\u3092\u53c2\u7167\u306e\u3053\u3068", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_8_publisher_20": {"attribute_name": "\u51fa\u7248\u8005", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_publisher": "\u65e5\u672c\u7d4c\u6e08\u56fd\u969b\u5171\u540c\u30bb\u30f3\u30bf\u30fc"}]}, "item_8_relation_25": {"attribute_name": "\u95a2\u4fc2URI", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_relation_type_id": {"subitem_relation_type_id_text": "http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf726ab.html", "subitem_relation_type_select": "URI"}}]}, "item_8_source_id_10": {"attribute_name": "\u66f8\u8a8c\u30ec\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9ID", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_source_identifier": "AA11450569", "subitem_source_identifier_type": "NCID"}]}, "item_8_subject_15": {"attribute_name": "\u65e5\u672c\u5341\u9032\u5206\u985e\u6cd5", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "335", "subitem_subject_scheme": "NDC"}]}, "item_8_text_21": {"attribute_name": "\u51fa\u7248\u8005\u5225\u540d", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]}, "item_8_text_34": {"attribute_name": "\u8cc7\u6e90\u30bf\u30a4\u30d7", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "Discussion Paper"}]}, "item_8_text_4": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005\u6240\u5c5e", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo"}]}, "item_access_right": {"attribute_name": "\u30a2\u30af\u30bb\u30b9\u6a29", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_access_right": "metadata only access", "subitem_access_right_uri": "http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Matsushima, Hitoshi"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "97008", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_keyword": {"attribute_name": "\u30ad\u30fc\u30ef\u30fc\u30c9", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "Finitely Repeated Prisoners\u2019Dilemma", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Small Fines", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Penance Contracts", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Full Collusion", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Uniqueness", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Renegotiation-Proofness", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D74, L14.", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "\u8a00\u8a9e", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "\u8cc7\u6e90\u30bf\u30a4\u30d7", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "technical report", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]}, "item_title": "Finitely Repeated Prisoners\u0027Dilemma with Small Fines : Penance Contract", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "Finitely Repeated Prisoners\u0027Dilemma with Small Fines : Penance Contract"}]}, "item_type_id": "8", "owner": "1", "path": ["9/7435/7436", "62/7433/7434"], "permalink_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/2261/33398", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "\u516c\u958b\u65e5", "attribute_value": "2013-05-31"}, "publish_date": "2013-05-31", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "42147", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["Finitely Repeated Prisoners\u0027Dilemma with Small Fines : Penance Contract"], "weko_shared_id": null}