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Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring : Theory and Experiments
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/50214
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/50214a1afbf59-6532-401a-9630-233b81c59428
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring : Theory and Experiments | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Infinitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Imperfect Private Monitoring | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Experimental Economics | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Monitoring Accuracy | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Social Preference | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Generous Tit-for-Tat | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL Classification: C70, C71, C72, C73, D03 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi× Toyama, Tomohisa |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Department of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Faculty of Engineering, Kogakuin University | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper experimentally examines infinitely repeated prisoners'dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring and random termination where the probability of termination is very low. Laboratory subjects make the cooperative action choices quite often, and make the cooperative action choice when monitoring is accurate more often than when it is inaccurate. Our experimental results, however, indicate that they make the cooperative action choice much less often than the game theory predicts. The subjects'naivete and social preferences concerning reciprocity prevent the device of regime shift between the reward and punishment phases from functioning in implicit collusion. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-795, 発行日 2011-04 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 335 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2011/2011cf795ab.html | |||||
