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Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/53463
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/53463d124d349-f373-4434-9ec6-9b9efb9551f5
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C71, C72, C73, D03. | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Infinitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Imperfect Private Monitoring | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Experimental Economics | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Monitoring Accuracy | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Social Preference | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi× Tanaka, Tomomi× Toyama, Tomohisa |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Department of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Economic Development & Global Education, LLC | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Faculty of Engineering, Kogakuin University | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | We examine repeated prisoners'dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and random termination where the termination probability is low. We run laboratory experiments and show subjects retaliate more severely when monitoring is more accurate. This experimental result contradicts the prediction of standard game theory. Instead of assuming full rationality and pure self-interest, we introduce naiveté and social preferences, i.e., reciprocal concerns, and develop a model that is consistent with, and uniquely predicts, the observed behavior in the experiments. Our behavioral model suggests there is a trade-off between naiveté and reciprocity. When people are concerned about reciprocity, they tend to make fewer random choices. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-879, 発行日 2013-03 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 335 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf879ab.html | |||||
