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Collective Risk Control And Group Security : The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2677
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/267761a37679-0f9d-4297-87d6-f507c147ce8c
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-06-03 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Collective Risk Control And Group Security : The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Risk Control | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Collective Action | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Public Goods | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Voluntary Provision | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | International Security | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL Classificaion Numbers: D74, D8, G11, H41, H56, H87 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Ihori, Toshihiro
× Ihori, Toshihiro× Martin, C. McGuire |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of California, Irvine | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | We provide an analysis of odds-improving self-protection for when it yields collective benefits to groups, such as alliances of nations, for whom risks of loss are public bads and prevention of loss is a public good. Our analysis of common risk reduction shows how diminishing returns in risk improvement can be folded into income effects. These income effects then imply that whether protection is inferior or normal depends on the risk aversion characteristics of underlying utility functions, and on the interaction between these, the level of risk, and marginal effectiveness of risk abatement. We demonstrate how public good inferiority is highly likely when the good is "group risk reduction." In fact, we discover a natural or endogenous limit on the size of a group and of the amount of risk controlling outlay it will provide under Nash behavior. We call this limit an "Inferior Goods Barrier" to voluntary risk reduction. For the paradigm case of declining risk aversion, increases in group size/wealth will cause provision of more safety to change from a normal to an inferior good thereby creating such a barrier. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-402, 発行日 2006-03 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 330 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2006/2006cf402ab.html | |||||
