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A Dynamic Multitask Model : Fixed Wage Contracts and Effort Allocation Problems
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/50184
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/501844fbb89f8-3607-479a-9aac-e00d0b7f6fd1
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2017-01-17 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | A Dynamic Multitask Model : Fixed Wage Contracts and Effort Allocation Problems | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Multitask | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | No Externality | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Unveri able Outputs | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Unveri able Investments | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Codes: D86, J41, J31 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Kamiya, Kazuya
× Kamiya, Kazuya× Sato, Meg |
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著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Crawford School of Economics & Government, The Australian National University | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) proposed a multitask principal-agent model in which the principal's utility is determined by several tasks the agent engages in. Their results depend on externalities between tasks and several assumptions related to the agent's effort. In this paper, we override certain assumptions (such as, the agent's effort can be negative and disutility is a non-increasing function of the effort up to some level) and obtain the similar outcomes in deriving fixed wage contracts and e¤ort allocation problems. We further introduce timing, outputs that are unverifiable (such as leadership and collegial work), and firm-specific knowledge as observed in actual labor markets and practices. This restructure also allows us to develop a multitask model without externalities, allowing us to study an optimal wage profile and find the optimal timing to sign a contract. Our model predicts that in industries where unverifiable outputs are valued, the more frequently the wage contract is renewed. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | Revised in January 2012. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-825, 発行日 2011-11 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2011/2011cf825ab.html |